Some thoughts on Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’ sacking of USAF Secretary Wynn and Chief of Staff Moseley:
The nuclear weapons SNAFUs described in the linked article were too serious to excuse, and ample reason to replace senior leadership. I can’t say I saw it coming, but I did wonder, back in 1992, what then-USAF Chief of Staff General Tony McPeak was thinking when he dissolved Strategic Air Command.
General McPeak’s new creation, Air Combat Command, was supposed to encompass the USAF’s “fire and steel” . . . its fighter, attack aircraft, bomber, ICBM, and special operations forces . . . but it was really a fighter command, run by and for the fighter mafia. Tony McPeak was a fighter pilot. Every USAF chief of staff since . . . Ron Fogelman, Michael Ryan, John Jumper, Michael Moseley . . . has been a fighter pilot. SAC, and in fact the entire USAF nuclear empire, was officially consigned to the back seat. I suppose nuclear screwups were only a matter of time.
But wait a minute . . . back in the 1950s, 60s, and early 70s, when SAC reigned supreme and bomber pilots ruled the USAF, we came this close to nuking ourselves, never mind our allies, not once but several times. Follow this link if you haven’t had a nightmare recently.
So I could be wrong. Maybe Tony McPeak putting SAC in its place didn’t lead to the recent screwups. Maybe they would have happened anyway. But I must note that Secretary Gates’ pick for USAF chief of staff, General Norton Schwartz, is a tactical airlift and special operations pilot, and his selection is a strong break with recent tradition.
Did Gates really fire these guys over the nuclear screwups? I don’t think so. I think he fired them for relentlessly pimping additional procurement of top-dollar weapon systems like the F-22 and F-35, for dragging their feet on supporting counterinsurgency-style warfighting and providing unmanned aerial drone support to ground forces of the US Army and Marine Corps, and for just plain not supporting joint warfighting. The nuclear incidents were a convenient cover. Check out this DefenseTech.org link for postings detailing the policy fights between Secretary Gates and the soon-to-be-former USAF secretary and chief of staff.
If I’m so damn smart, what would I do? I’d put all nuclear forces . . . land and sea-based . . . together in one new service. I’d give the rest of the USAF back to the Army. And I’m only half joking . . . I’d give ’em the A-10s for sure.
I’m hearing a slightly different take. There are three issues at play: the two nuke screw ups (totally inexcusable), the next is the war-itis argument (which you covered succinctly), and AF manning levels. Under Wynne and Moseley, the AF was going down to 316,000, the lowest since 1950. The reason was related to paying for new weapons systems, i.e. the F-22 and F-35. Gates is holding at 330,000.
It was the combination of all three that got them fired. An ex SAC buddy puts the nuke screw ups as the straw, but who knows what really goes on behind closed doors at the Puzzle Palace? The name of the game has always been air superiority. It will be interesting to see what happens if we lose it.
Dick,
That’s an interesting view. Based on what you said, though, the manning reduction was directly tied to more F-22s & F-35s, so I see it as a finding, not a cause. Moreover, if the proposal to reduce manning came from Wynne & Moseley, it was probably perceived as an AF attempt to undermine or subvert SecDef direction, and no SecDef would or could tolerate that.
You know, I owe my career to the fighter mafia and those who, in our day, defended gold-plated weapon systems like the F-15 and F-16 against the Luddites who would have had us buy a couple of thousand F-5s instead.
And our side was right to buy those gold-plated weapon systems, because they were a major factor in defeating the Soviet Union, even though we never fired a shot. Had we bought the F-5s instead . . . well, who knows? I don’t think things would have turned out the way they did, though.
So yes, I think we need the F-22 & F-35. The question is, how many?
The older F-15Cs are shot (longerons) and can’t be rebuilt. How long the newest F-15Cs can continue flying in an air superiority role, I couldn’t guess. There was a window where we might have kept the F-15E line going, and if we had we could have built an air superiority version of the Mudhen for very little (compared to what Raptors cost). But we didn’t and AFAIK the production line, or even the capability to reopen it, is gone. Too bad. A mix of 30% F-22s and 70% new F-15Es might have been able to establish and maintain air superiority against any likely threat that might emerge over the next 20-30 years.
I really would give the A-10s to the Army, though.